MYANMAR – Surrounding Country’s Interests

China’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar

(compiled by Rotarian Terry McGauley <terry.mcgauley@shaw.ca>

Myanmar, sharing a 2,185-kilometer border with China’s Yunnan Province, holds significant geostrategic and economic value for Beijing. These interests have intensified since the 2021 military coup, which sparked a nationwide civil war between the junta, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and pro-democracy forces. China’s approach prioritizes safeguarding its investments and access routes amid the instability, often described as a “hedging strategy” to maintain influence regardless of the conflict’s outcome. Key interests include:

• Economic Connectivity via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Myanmar is central to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a flagship BRI project connecting Kunming in Yunnan to the Indian Ocean through ports like Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State. This provides China with an overland alternative to the vulnerable Malacca Strait for energy imports and trade, reducing dependence on sea routes potentially disrupted by U.S. or Indian naval presence. Pipelines for oil and gas already transport resources directly to China, bypassing the South China Sea.
• Resource Access and Investments: China is Myanmar’s largest trading partner and investor, with billions poured into mining (copper, jade, rare earths), hydropower, and infrastructure. Projects like the Myitsone Dam (on hold but symbolically important) and oil/gas fields ensure steady resource flows. Beijing views these as vital for its energy security and industrial needs, with Yunnan Province particularly benefiting from cross-border trade.
• Border Security and Stability: Instability in Myanmar fuels cross-border issues like drug trafficking (e.g., methamphetamines from Shan State), cyber scams run by Chinese-linked syndicates, and refugee flows, all threatening Yunnan’s social order. China seeks “controlled instability”—enough chaos to keep the junta dependent but not so much that it endangers borders or trade. This includes stabilizing key areas like northern Shan and Rakhine States.
• Geopolitical Leverage: Myanmar counters India’s “Act East” policy and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy by offering China a foothold in South Asia. It allows Beijing to project influence into the Bay of Bengal, encircle India, and secure rare earth supplies critical for tech dominance. Long-term, China aims to integrate Myanmar economically to prevent Western or Indian dominance.

These interests are not purely altruistic; Beijing’s rhetoric of “non-interference” masks a pragmatic focus on protecting assets, even if it prolongs the conflict.

China’s Role in the Myanmar Conflict

Since the 2021 coup, China has played a pivotal, multifaceted role in Myanmar’s civil war, which has displaced millions and killed tens of thousands. Officially adhering to a “non-interference” policy, Beijing has actively shaped the conflict through military, diplomatic, and economic levers—arming the junta while hedging bets with rebels—to ensure outcomes align with its interests. This “double game” has drawn criticism for exacerbating divisions and hindering peace.

• Support for the Military Junta: As the junta’s primary backer, China provides diplomatic cover at the UN (vetoing resolutions), arms sales (e.g., drones, artillery), and economic lifelines like currency swaps and debt relief to prevent collapse. This aid has helped the regime regain ground in 2025, including retaking Lashio in northern Shan State. Beijing views the junta as a stable partner for BRI projects, despite its brutality, and has urged elections (planned for 2025) as a path to legitimacy. Analysts note China’s intervention has made the war “more intractable” by propping up a failing regime.
• Engagement with Ethnic Armed Groups (EAOs): To hedge against junta weakness, China cultivates ties with border-based EAOs like the United Wa State Army and Kokang forces, supplying arms and pressuring them for ceasefires via “five cuts” tactics (disrupting finances, intelligence, etc.). In 2024-2025, Beijing brokered truces in northern Shan but punished non-compliant groups by closing border crossings, disrupting trade and aid. This divide-and-rule approach exploits EAO rivalries, preventing a unified anti-junta front.
• Direct Interventions and Border Measures: China has escalated involvement, with reports of PLA troops aiding junta operations near the border and cyber crackdowns on scam centers in rebel-held areas. In late 2024, Beijing hosted junta-EAO talks in Kunming, yielding fragile ceasefires. However, actions like border shutdowns (e.g., with Thailand in 2025) aim to starve rebels of revenue while boosting junta control. Speculation of full military intervention grows if core interests (e.g., pipelines) are threatened, though Beijing prefers proxies to avoid overcommitment.
• Broader Regional Dynamics: China’s role intersects with global powers—countering U.S. sanctions and Indian outreach—while exploiting the war for leverage. Critics, including Myanmar activists, accuse Beijing of “pulling strings” by arming both sides, fueling endless conflict for economic gain. Recent X discussions highlight fears of Chinese “imperialism,” with the junta now blaming external actors like the U.S. for its woes, potentially targeting China next if dependencies sour.

In summary, China’s interests drive a calculated involvement that sustains the status quo: junta survival for project security, rebel pressure for border calm. This has stalled multilateral peace efforts, with calls for ASEAN and Western coordination to counter Beijing’s dominance. As of late 2025, the conflict’s trajectory hinges on whether China opts for deeper intervention or restrained hedging.

India’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar

India’s engagement with Myanmar is driven by its “Act East” policy, which seeks to integrate its remote northeastern states economically and strategically with Southeast Asia. Sharing a 1,643-km porous border with four northeastern states (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram), Myanmar is pivotal for New Delhi’s security and development goals. Since the 2021 military coup and ensuing civil war, India’s interests have sharpened amid rising Chinese influence, focusing on a pragmatic “double game” of balancing ties with the junta and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to hedge risks. As of late 2025, these include:

• Regional Connectivity and Infrastructure: Myanmar is key to unlocking India’s landlocked northeast via projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which links Kolkata to Sittwe port and Mizoram, bypassing Bangladesh and reducing reliance on the narrow Siliguri Corridor (“Chicken’s Neck”). This aligns with broader initiatives like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and potential extensions to ASEAN markets. However, conflict has stalled progress, with EAO control over Rakhine State threatening access.
• Countering Chinese Influence: Beijing’s dominance via the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and investments in Kyaukpyu port encircles India’s northeast and secures China’s Indian Ocean access. India views Myanmar as a buffer to limit this, promoting alternative connectivity to dilute BRI’s hold. Analysts argue supporting pro-democracy forces could better serve this long-term, but Delhi prioritizes stability to avoid a pro-China rebel bloc.
• Border Security and Insurgency Control: Instability fuels spillover, including shelter for Indian insurgents (e.g., NSCN factions) in Myanmar’s Sagaing and Kachin regions, drug trafficking, and refugee flows straining Manipur and Mizoram. India seeks junta cooperation for joint operations, while engaging EAOs to deny safe havens. Recent clashes, like Indian forces killing 10 rebels in June 2025, highlight fears of cross-border escalation.
• Resource Access and Economic Ties: Myanmar offers critical minerals (e.g., rare earths, lithium) vital for India’s tech and EV sectors, plus hydropower and trade routes. Bilateral trade hit $2.5 billion in 2024-25, with India investing $1.2 billion in energy and infrastructure. Yunnan-like benefits for India’s northeast include cross-border power grids and tourism.
• Northeast Development and Stability: Myanmar’s chaos exacerbates ethnic tensions in Manipur (e.g., Kuki-Meitei clashes linked to Chin refugees) and hinders $10 billion in planned projects. Stability ensures refugee management and cultural ties with ethnic kin across the border.

India’s non-interference stance masks these pragmatic pursuits, but critics warn the “double game” risks alienating all sides.

India’s Role in the Myanmar Conflict

India has adopted a cautious, multi-track approach since the 2021 coup, providing the junta with diplomatic and economic support while quietly engaging EAOs and offering humanitarian aid. This “evolving ties” strategy preserves leverage amid the war, where rebels control 42% of territory as of October 2025. New Delhi’s actions aim to contain spillover without full commitment, drawing ASEAN criticism for undermining peace efforts.

• Diplomatic Backing for the Junta: India has hosted junta leader Min Aung Hlaing multiple times, including a September 2025 Delhi visit where PM Modi endorsed upcoming elections (set for December 2025) as a “legitimacy path,” pledging election monitors. This contrasts Western sanctions, prioritizing junta ties for security pacts and project access, though it risks prolonging the conflict.
• Engagement with Rebels and EAOs: To safeguard borders, India has reached out to groups like the Arakan Army (controlling Rakhine) and Kachin Independence Army, offering non-lethal aid and intelligence-sharing since 2024. This hedges against junta collapse but has strained relations, as seen in the June 2025 border killings that shattered informal truces. Outreach to the National Unity Government (NUG) remains limited.
• Security and Counter-Insurgency Measures: Joint operations with the junta target Indian rebels in Myanmar, with India providing training and arms (e.g., BrahMos missiles in 2024). Border fencing and patrols have intensified, but porous terrain allows 70,000+ refugees since 2021, mostly Chin in Mizoram. Army Chief Gen. Upendra Dwivedi noted in November 2025 that northeastern states host thousands, emphasizing humanitarian screening amid insurgency fears.
• Humanitarian and Economic Support: India has delivered $50 million in aid (rice, medicines) via the junta and directly to EAO areas, plus $25 million for refugee camps. It advocates ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus but vetoes UN resolutions against the junta. Economically, debt relief and project funding (e.g., restarting Kaladan) prop up Naypyitaw, though rebel gains have disrupted supply lines.

In summary, India’s role sustains the junta’s viability for short-term gains while probing rebels for border calm, but this has fueled accusations of “short-sighted” diplomacy that ignores pro-democracy aspirations. As elections loom and China deepens its “dual-track” meddling, Delhi faces pressure to pivot toward inclusive engagement or risk isolation in a fragmenting Myanmar. Recent X chatter underscores refugee strains and project woes, with calls for bolder anti-China moves.

Thailand’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar

Thailand shares a 2,400-kilometer border with Myanmar, making the latter’s stability a direct national security priority for Bangkok. The ongoing civil war since the 2021 military coup has amplified these concerns, as instability risks spillover effects including refugee influxes, border skirmishes, and disruptions to vital economic ties. Thailand’s interests are multifaceted, balancing economic gains, security imperatives, and regional diplomacy. Key aspects include:

• Economic Dependence and Trade: Myanmar is Thailand’s seventh-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade valued at around US$6 billion annually before the coup, though it declined by 46% at key border crossings like Mae Sot-Myawaddy in 2024 due to conflict. Thailand relies on Myanmar for 15% of its natural gas imports via pipelines like Yadana, where Thai firm PTT holds a 63% stake. Investments in oil, gas, mining, and border casinos (with Thai ownership in at least 17 facilities in Myawaddy) generate billions in revenue. A protracted war threatens these assets, exposes Thai businesses to volatility, and fuels illicit activities like online scams and human trafficking along the border.
• Security and Border Stability: The civil war has displaced over 3 million people internally in Myanmar, with tens of thousands fleeing to Thailand—adding to the existing 1.8 million registered Myanmar migrant workers and 81,000 refugees. Recent escalations, such as the Karen National Liberation Army’s (KNLA) capture of Myawaddy in April 2024 and junta airstrikes near the border, prompted Thai military deployments and airspace violations. Spillover includes junta drones crashing in Thailand (e.g., July 2025) and civilian casualties from cross-border fire, heightening fears of broader insecurity. Thailand also combats transnational crime, including scam centers in Myawaddy, where junta raids in November 2025 arrested nearly 1,600 foreign nationals.
• Energy and Resource Access: Beyond gas, Myanmar’s untapped resources (timber, gems, hydropower) are vital for Thailand’s economy. Instability jeopardizes projects tied to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in which Thailand participates, and could invite greater Chinese influence if Bangkok’s leverage wanes.
• Geopolitical and Regional Role: As a frontline ASEAN member, Thailand views Myanmar as a “twin pillar” for mainland Southeast Asian stability. A junta collapse could create a power vacuum, drawing in China or India more aggressively, while empowering ethnic armed groups (EAOs) with ties to Thai borders. Long-standing military-to-military links, dating to the 1990s, position Thailand to influence outcomes, but domestic political shifts (e.g., from Prayut’s junta-friendly era to Srettha’s humanitarian focus) add complexity.

In essence, Thailand seeks a stable Myanmar to safeguard its economy (worth US$3.5 billion in border trade alone) and prevent a refugee “border crisis” that could strain resources and incite domestic unrest.

Thailand’s Role in the Myanmar Conflict

Thailand occupies a delicate, dual-track position: a pragmatic ally to the junta for economic continuity, yet an aspiring mediator and humanitarian actor within ASEAN to mitigate spillover and burnish its regional credentials. This “business-as-usual” approach, criticized for lacking moral baselines, has evolved slightly under recent governments but remains constrained by vested interests. Its role encompasses:

• Diplomatic Support and Mediation Efforts: Thailand has historic ties with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military), providing back-channel diplomacy and refusing to fully condemn the coup. It advocates ASEAN’s “Five-Point Consensus” (2021) for dialogue and humanitarian access, leading limited cross-border aid via a Thai-Myanmar task force established in 2023. In 2024-2025, Bangkok hosted high-level talks, including a December 2024 summit with China, India, Bangladesh, and Laos, to push for junta elections (deemed “neither free nor credible” by Thai officials in November 2025) and Suu Kyi’s release. Track 1.5 dialogues engage EAOs, the National Unity Government (NUG), and exiles, though efforts like Thaksin Shinawatra’s involvement drew resistance backlash due to his junta links. Thailand’s foreign minister met junta leader Min Aung Hlaing in February 2025, prioritizing “ASEAN centrality” over sanctions.
• Humanitarian and Refugee Management: Hosting over 2 million Myanmar nationals, Thailand provides aid but faces criticism for pushbacks and poor camp conditions. It coordinates UNHCR efforts, treats border casualties (e.g., disarming 500+ fleeing soldiers and civilians in July 2025), and warns against airspace violations. Recent pledges under Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra emphasize inclusive humanitarian corridors, though implementation is spotty amid resource strains.
• Economic Enabler and Indirect Participant: By maintaining investments and trade, Thailand indirectly sustains the junta, which relies on gas revenues for 40% of its budget to fund the war. Thai elites’ stakes in junta-linked firms (e.g., Hlaing Sang Holdings) complicate neutrality. Border casinos and labor migration (1.8 million workers) perpetuate gray economies, while Thailand’s crackdowns on scams (prompted by China) show selective intervention.
• Challenges and Criticisms: Bangkok’s “unreliability” as a broker stems from competing interests—military elites favor the junta, while civilians push mediation—risking ASEAN’s credibility. Experts urge “strategic engagement” with clear baselines, like prisoner releases, but Thailand avoids alienating the Tatmadaw to prevent refugee surges or energy cuts. As of November 2025, ongoing clashes (e.g., junta killings near the border) underscore the war’s intensification, with Thailand deploying troops reactively.

Overall, Thailand’s role is pivotal yet passive: a “hidden key player” leveraging proximity for quiet influence, but prioritizing self-interest over bold intervention. A more proactive stance could stabilize the region, but requires navigating domestic politics and great-power rivalries.

Bangladesh’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar

Bangladesh shares a 271-kilometer porous border with Myanmar’s Rakhine State, making the latter’s instability a core national security concern for Dhaka. The 2021 military coup and ensuing civil war have exacerbated these risks, with spillover effects including refugee surges, border clashes, and threats to regional connectivity. Under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus since August 2024, Bangladesh’s interests remain centered on humanitarian relief, security, and economic pragmatism, though domestic political transitions have introduced calls for bolder diplomacy. Key aspects include:

• Rohingya Repatriation and Humanitarian Burden: The Rohingya crisis dominates, with over 1.1 million refugees in Cox’s Bazar camps straining resources amid declining aid (the 2025 Joint Response Plan is only 12% funded). Bangladesh views Myanmar’s instability—exacerbated by Arakan Army (AA) control of much of Rakhine—as blocking safe, voluntary returns. Yunus has emphasized at the UN that the crisis “originated in Myanmar and its solution lies in Myanmar,” urging international pressure for citizenship and rights. New arrivals (50,000 confirmed in 2025) heighten fears of famine and malnutrition, costing Bangladesh billions annually in social, environmental, and financial terms.
• Border Security and Spillover Risks: Civil war clashes have caused cross-border incidents, including junta artillery killing Bangladeshis (e.g., two deaths in February 2024) and airspace violations. The AA’s dominance along the border raises concerns of refugee influxes, arms smuggling, and ethnic tensions spilling into Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bangladesh detains fleeing Myanmar personnel (e.g., five in November 2025) and combats Rohingya insurgencies in camps, where groups like ARSA and RSO recruit amid frustration over repatriation delays. A junta collapse could empower anti-Rohingya AA forces, complicating returns.
• Economic Connectivity and Regional Stability: Myanmar is vital for Bangladesh’s access to ASEAN markets via BIMSTEC and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport (linking India’s northeast via Rakhine) face disruptions from conflict. Trade, though modest, supports border economies, and instability threatens hydropower, fisheries, and smuggling routes (e.g., yaba drugs). China and India’s competing interests—Beijing’s BRI investments versus New Delhi’s Act East—position Bangladesh as a balancer, seeking stability to avoid becoming a proxy in great-power rivalries.
• Geopolitical Balancing: As a Muslim-majority nation, Bangladesh leverages OIC solidarity against Rohingya persecution but avoids alienating China (Myanmar’s junta backer). Yunus’s multilateral push targets US and EU aid, while domestic anti-Rohingya sentiment (fueled by resource strains) pressures for repatriation. A stable Myanmar prevents a “humanitarian disaster” in Southeast Asia, per UN warnings.

In summary, Bangladesh prioritizes repatriation to alleviate its “victim” status in the crisis, while safeguarding borders and economic links amid Myanmar’s fragmentation. Instability risks turning Rakhine into a “geopolitical flashpoint,” per analysts.

Bangladesh’s Role in the Myanmar Conflict

Bangladesh maintains a neutral, defensive posture in Myanmar’s civil war, focusing on containment rather than intervention, though spillover has forced pragmatic engagements. As a non-ASEAN member with limited leverage, Dhaka’s role is primarily reactive: managing refugees, securing borders, and advocating diplomatically. The Yunus regime has signaled a multilateral shift, but vested interests constrain bolder action. Its involvement includes:

• Diplomatic Advocacy and Repatriation Efforts: Bangladesh leads UN and OIC pushes for Rohingya rights, with Yunus calling for ICJ enforcement of genocide prevention orders and a “practical roadmap” for returns at the 2025 UNGA. It engages the junta via ASEAN channels but has opened unofficial lines with the AA (controlling 80% of Rakhine) for border de-escalation—e.g., a May 2025 recall of its ambassador over AA contacts drew junta ire. Proposals for a UN-supervised humanitarian corridor to Rakhine (floated in May 2025) aim for aid delivery but face skepticism as AA dominance could divert supplies. Dhaka balances junta ties with rebel outreach, conditioning AA engagement on halting Rohingya persecution and denying haven to Bangladeshi insurgents like the Kuki-Chin National Front.
• Border Security and Humanitarian Management: Hosting 1.1 million Rohingya, Bangladesh coordinates UNHCR efforts but faces criticism for camp insecurity—e.g., Rohingya armed groups (ARSA, RSO) clashing with AA, recruiting via religious appeals, and fueling yaba trade. It detains cross-border intruders (e.g., 40,000+ fled to neighbors since 2021) and conducts anti-smuggling operations. Recent pledges under Yunus emphasize “dignified” returns and intergenerational education, but pushbacks and arbitrary detentions (e.g., UN ruling on Rohingya leader Dil Mohammed in 2025) persist. Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) has arrested junta defectors amid AA offensives.
• Regional and Multilateral Coordination: As a BIMSTEC member, Bangladesh seeks ASEAN consensus on Rohingya aid, urging China and India to pressure the junta. It hosts talks (e.g., 2025 Bangkok BIMSTEC summit) but avoids military entanglement, despite speculation of US proxy support via ARSA arming. Domestically, it sponsors Rohingya civil society for repatriation advocacy, though legitimacy issues arise from perceived bias.
• Challenges and Criticisms: Neutrality is strained by Rohingya insurgencies in camps (pausing infighting to target AA) and junta “four cuts” tactics displacing civilians. Experts urge a task force with diverse stakeholders for inclusive diplomacy, warning of AA-Rohingya reconciliation barriers. Funding shortfalls and anti-refugee sentiment risk radicalization, while great-power meddling (China’s junta backing, US non-lethal aid) complicates Dhaka’s balancing act.

Overall, Bangladesh’s role is custodial and diplomatic: a reluctant host mitigating spillover while pressing for resolution, but constrained by Myanmar’s chaos and domestic pressures. A proactive stance—e.g., AA trust-building—could aid repatriation, yet risks entanglement in the war. As of November 2025, escalating Rakhine clashes underscore the urgency for sustainable solutions.

Russia’s Strategic Interests in Myanmar

Russia’s engagement in Myanmar is driven by geopolitical isolation post-2022 Ukraine invasion, economic opportunism, and a desire to counter Western influence in Asia. As both nations face international pariah status—the junta from the 2021 coup and Russia from sanctions—Myanmar serves as a reliable partner for arms exports, resource access, and diplomatic validation. Key interests include:

• Arms Sales and Military-Industrial Revenue: Myanmar is a lucrative market for Russia’s defense sector, which faces Western sanctions limiting exports elsewhere. Since 2021, Russian entities have supplied at least US$406 million in arms and equipment, including jets, helicopters, and drones used in airstrikes. This sustains Russia’s military-industrial complex amid Ukraine war demands, with Myanmar providing a “marriage of convenience” for hardware sales.
• Energy and Resource Diversification: Myanmar’s natural gas, oil, and minerals offer Russia alternatives to sanctioned European markets. Post-coup, Russia has provided energy supplies and signed a 2025 agreement for a small-scale nuclear plant, enhancing bilateral trade (up 40% in 2024). This counters Russia’s energy isolation while helping Myanmar’s junta address domestic shortages.
• Geopolitical Foothold in Southeast Asia: With ties limited to Vietnam, Myanmar bolsters Russia’s Asian presence. Support for the junta—via UN vetoes and high-level visits—builds leverage against US-led isolation, positioning Russia as a “strategic partner” in ASEAN’s periphery. A stable junta ally prevents Chinese monopoly, aligning with Moscow’s multipolar ambitions.
• Mutual Diplomatic Cover: The junta’s endorsement of Russia’s Ukraine invasion reciprocates UN support, shielding both from global scrutiny. As US aid to Myanmar’s opposition wanes, Russia fills the void, potentially tipping the civil war balance.

Overall, Myanmar advances Russia’s “pivot to Asia,” yielding US$100+ million in annual trade by 2022, though Ukraine strains supply capacity.

Russia’s Role in the Myanmar Conflict

Russia has been a steadfast backer of the military junta (State Administration Council, SAC) since the 2021 coup, providing material, diplomatic, and technical support that sustains its war effort against the National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). While not directly intervening militarily, Moscow’s aid has enabled junta atrocities, including airstrikes killing thousands of civilians (over 6,486 reported by April 2025). Its role has deepened post-2022, with four junta leader visits to Russia, but faces constraints from Russia’s own conflicts. Key aspects include:

• Military Aid and Training: Russia is the junta’s primary arms supplier, delivering MiG-29 jets, Su-30 fighters, Yak-130 aircraft, Mi-35 helicopters, Pantsir-S1 missiles, Orlan-10E drones, and radar systems—used in 95% civilian-targeted operations per UN estimates. Over 50 Myanmar pilots trained in Russia since 2021; technicians maintain aircraft and assist drone warfare in Rakhine. A 2023 joint maritime exercise and 2025 Armed Forces Day honors for Russian officials underscore ties. Supplies dipped in 2025 due to Ukraine needs, but drone production deals persist.
• Diplomatic Legitimization: Russia blocked UN Security Council actions against the junta, vetoing resolutions on violence and humanitarian access. It hailed the SAC as a “reliable ally” post-coup, hosting Min Aung Hlaing in Moscow (March 2025, first Putin invite) to discuss trade and support sham elections. Bilateral pacts include new consulates in St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk.
• Economic and Energy Support: Amid junta blackouts, Russia supplies fuel and explores nuclear energy. Trade hit US$104 million in 2022, with junta requests for Russian intervention framed as anti-terrorism aid. Myanmar reciprocated by exporting optics for Russian tanks in Ukraine.
• Challenges and Criticisms: UN rapporteur Tom Andrews condemned Russia’s weapons as fueling “slaughter of innocents,” with jets bombing schools and villages. As junta controls shrink (<50% territory by 2025), Russia’s waning supplies may accelerate collapse, handing China greater influence. Experts warn of escalation if Moscow prioritizes Ukraine.

In sum, Russia’s role is enabler-in-chief: propping the junta to mutual benefit, but risking backlash as Myanmar’s war intensifies (3.5 million IDPs by March 2025). A junta fall could erode gains, yet ties remain “ever tighter” per analysts.