MYANMAR – Conflict Resolution Systems

(compiled by Rotarian Terry McGauley, terry.mcgauley@shaw.ca)

Successful conflict resolution in a country with serious internal conflicts (ethnic, religious, political, ideological, or resource-based) is extremely difficult, but history and political science offer a set of techniques and approaches that have worked in real cases — or at least significantly reduced violence. No single recipe fits all situations, but the most effective strategies usually combine several of the following elements:

1. Inclusive, Credible Negotiated Settlement (Power-Sharing or Autonomy)

The vast majority of modern civil wars that end in lasting peace do so through negotiated settlement rather than total military victory.

Successful examples:

• South Africa (1990–1994): Interim constitution + power-sharing government + Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
• Northern Ireland (Good Friday Agreement 1998): Power-sharing institutions, consociational democracy, decommissioning of weapons, cross-community veto rights.
• Colombia (2016 peace accord with FARC): Territorial political representation, rural reform, transitional justice.

Key ingredients:

• All major armed factions must be at the table or co-opted.
• External mediators with leverage (e.g., U.S. in Dayton for Bosnia, Norway in several cases, African Union in some African conflicts).
• Clear timeline and phased implementation (DDR = Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of combatants).

2. Constitutional Design that Accommodates Identity Groups

• Federalism or strong territorial autonomy (Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism — mixed results; Switzerland, Canada, India, Belgium — more successful).
• Consociational democracy (grand coalitions, proportional representation, mutual vetoes, segmental autonomy) → Lebanon (Taif 1989), Bosnia (Dayton 1995), Northern Ireland.
• Electoral systems that encourage moderation (e.g., Alternative Vote or proportional representation instead of winner-take-all).

3. Robust Transitional Justice Mechanisms

Countries that combine accountability and reconciliation tend to have lower relapse rates:

• Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (South Africa, Timor-Leste, Peru, Canada with Indigenous peoples).
• Hybrid or international tribunals when domestic justice is impossible (Sierra Leone, Cambodia).
• Amnesty only when paired with truth-telling and victim reparations (usually more stable than blanket amnesties or full prosecution).

4. Security Sector Reform (SSR) and DDR

• Professional, multi-ethnic army and police (Bosnia, Liberia, Northern Ireland).
• Vetting of human-rights abusers from security forces.
• Community policing models in divided societies.

5. Economic Reconstruction and Reducing Horizontal Inequalities

• Marshall-Plan-style reconstruction (rarely replicated, but Bosnia and Timor-Leste had large donor conferences).
• Targeted development in formerly rebel-held or marginalized regions (Aceh after 2005 peace deal in Indonesia; Mindanao ARMM in Philippines).
• Jobs programs for ex-combatants and youth bulge populations.

6. Regional and International Guarantees

• Peacekeeping forces with robust mandates (Namibia 1989, Cambodia 1991–93, Liberia 2003–, Mali minus recent withdrawal).
• Regional powers acting as guarantors (IGAD in South Sudan and Somalia — partial success; ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone — more successful).

7. Decentralization / Autonomy Without Secession (Often the Sweet Spot)

• Åland Islands (Finland): Demilitarized, Swedish-speaking autonomous region since 1921.
• South Tyrol (Italy): One of the most successful autonomy arrangements after ethnic tensions.
• Aceh and Papua (Indonesia): Special autonomy + resource-sharing after separatist wars.
• Mindanao (Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, Philippines 2019).

8. Leadership Willing to Take Political Risks

Almost every successful case had at least one leader (often on both sides) willing to risk their political career:

• De Klerk and Mandela (South Africa)
• Hume, Trimble, Adams, McGuinness (Northern Ireland)
• Arafat and Rabin (Oslo — failed, but showed the necessity)
• Uribe and Santos (Colombia — opposite approaches, but Santos took the risk)

What Usually Fails or Makes Things Worse

• “Fight and talk” without credible commitment to ceasefires.
• Winner-take-all elections immediately after war (Angola 1992, Libya 2014).
• Peace agreements that exclude major armed groups (Darfur, South Sudan multiple times).
• Overly centralized “unitary state” insistence when identity cleavages are deep.
• Foreign-imposed solutions without local buy-in (Afghanistan 2001–2021, Iraq 2003–2011).

Current or Recent Partial Successes Worth Studying (2020s)

• Ethiopia (2022 Pretoria Agreement ending Tigray war) — fragile but violence down dramatically.
• Colombia (2016–ongoing implementation) — homicide rate fell >50 % even with remaining dissident groups.
• Sudan (Juba Peace Agreement 2020) — partial; some rebel groups joined, but later coup and new war.

In short, the countries that moved from “serious internal conflict” to “imperfect but lasting peace” almost always used a combination of inclusive negotiations, power-sharing or autonomy institutions, security sector reform, economic packages, and some form of transitional justice — backed by patient international support and leaders willing to compromise.

No magic bullet exists, but total military victory is rare and usually only stable when followed by the same reconciliation measures anyway (e.g., Sri Lanka 2009 — peace but ongoing grievances; Rwanda 1994 — stable but authoritarian). The negotiated, inclusive path has a far higher long-term success rate.

External Mediators

External mediators play a decisive — and often make-or-break — role in resolving serious internal conflicts. When trust between domestic parties has completely collapsed, an outside actor is frequently the only entity capable of convening talks, providing guarantees, and creating consequences for spoilers.

Here is a breakdown of what external mediators actually do, which types tend to work best, and real-world evidence of their impact.

Core Functions of Successful External Mediators

1. Convening Power
   • Get all armed parties to the table (often the hardest first step).
   • Examples: Norway (Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers, Colombia FARC, Philippines MILF); Switzerland + Algeria (Eritrea–Ethiopia 2018); Qatar (Taliban–U.S. Doha talks).
2. Impartiality or Perceived Neutrality
   • Parties will only talk if they believe the mediator is not secretly backing the other side.
   • Small or middle powers with no colonial history in the region usually do best (Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Qatar, Kenya, Algeria).
3. Leverage (Carrots and Sticks)
   • Economic aid, sanctions relief, debt cancellation, recognition.
   • Threat of sanctions, travel bans, ICC referrals, arms embargoes.
   • Example: U.S. pressure on Serbia (Dayton 1995); EU membership carrot for Balkans states; African Union suspension threat for coup leaders.
4. Guarantor Role
   • Promise to monitor and enforce the agreement.
   • Deploy peacekeepers, verification missions, or sanctions committees.
   • Examples: UN in Namibia 1989, Cambodia 1991–93, Liberia 2003–2018; NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo.
5. Technical Expertise & Drafting
   • Provide constitutional, electoral, DDR, and transitional-justice templates that local parties often lack.
   • Example: UN Mediation Support Unit templates used in Nepal, Yemen, Libya talks.
6. Shuttle Diplomacy & Confidence-Building Measures
   • Keep talks alive when face-to-face meetings are impossible.
   • Example: U.S. Senator George Mitchell’s 700+ days of shuttle diplomacy for Good Friday Agreement.

Which Mediators Have the Best Track Records (1990–2025)?

Critical Success Factors for External Mediators

1. Unity of the International Community
   • When major powers are divided (Russia vs. West in Syria, Saudi vs. Iran in Yemen), mediation almost always fails.
2. Sustained Engagement Over Years
   • Norway spent 12 years quietly mediating in Colombia and Sudan before breakthroughs.
3. Willingness to Walk Away or Use Coercion
   • The most successful mediators combine patience with credible threats (e.g., U.S. bombing + diplomacy in Dayton; ECOWAS military threat in Gambia 2017).
4. Local Ownership as the End Goal
   • The best mediators design themselves out of a job (hand over to regional or local mechanisms after 5–10 years).

Recent Examples (2020–2025)

• Ethiopia (Tigray War 2022) Mediator: African Union (Obasanjo) backed quietly by U.S./EU sanctions threats → Pretoria Agreement ended major fighting within weeks.
• Sudan (RSF vs. Army 2023–ongoing) Mediators: Saudi–U.S. (Jeddah process + IGAD + UAE (quiet) → multiple failed ceasefires because external patrons keep arming both sides.
• Myanmar post-2021 coup Mediator: ASEAN → almost zero results because of lack of leverage and unity.

Bottom Line

External mediators do not create peace by themselves — they create the conditions under which local actors can take risks for peace. The most effective ones are:

• Perceived as neutral or at least balanced
• Patient (multi-year engagement)
• Backed by unified international pressure/rewards
• Willing to deploy peacekeepers or monitors as guarantors

When those elements are missing (as in Northern Ireland, Colombia, Bosnia, Aceh), the conflict usually moves from “intractable” to “managed” and often to lasting peace. When they are absent (Syria, Yemen, Libya, South Sudan pre-2018), even the best mediators fail.

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) in Serious Internal Conflicts

A TRC is a temporary, official body that investigates a past history of massive human-rights violations, gives victims a public platform to tell their stories, establishes a shared historical record, and makes recommendations for reform and reparations. It is almost never a substitute for criminal trials, but it is one of the most widely used tools to break cycles of revenge and denial after civil wars, genocides, or authoritarian regimes.

When and Why TRCs Have Worked Best

Design Features That Make TRCs Effective

1. Victim-Centered Process
   • Public hearings with victims speaking in their own language
   • Dignity, security, and psychological support for witnesses → South Africa, Canada, Tunisia
2. Clear Link Between Truth and Amnesty (or Not)
   • South Africa: individualised amnesty only for full, public confession of political crimes → created huge incentive to talk
   • Most others (Peru, Timor, Kenya 2009–2013): no amnesty → less perpetrator cooperation but more justice
3. Strong, Independent Leadership and Staff
   • Archbishop Tutu (South Africa), Salim Salim (Timor), Sihem Bensedrine (Tunisia)
   • When commissioners are seen as government puppets (Chile 1990, Sri Lanka 2015), the process loses credibility
4. Real Power to Compel Testimony and Documents
   • Subpoena power + protection against self-incrimination (South Africa, Tunisia) produced far more revelations than voluntary models
5. Concrete Recommendations + Follow-Up Mechanism
   • Best: reparations fund, institutional reforms, memorials, vetting
   • Canada and Colombia (ongoing since 2018) created permanent follow-up bodies
   • Worst: Sierra Leone, Kenya, Liberia — reports shelved, no implementation
6. Public Broadcast and Education
   • Live radio/TV (South Africa), school curriculum changes (Canada, Germany after Holocaust Commission), public archives

Common Failures and Risks

• “Truth instead of justice” backlash when perpetrators walk free with no confession (Argentina 1985, El Salvador 1993)
• Government uses TRC to whitewash (Sri Lanka multiple times, Uganda)
• Overly narrow mandate (Chile 1990 only “disappeared,” not torture or exile)
• No reparations budget → victims feel re-traumatised (Kenya, Liberia)

Current and Recent TRCs (2020–2025)

• Colombia (2018–2024, extended): Part of the 2016 peace accord. Already acknowledged responsibility for >50 000 killings; strongest powers ever given to a truth commission (de facto judicial findings).
• The Gambia (2018–2024): After Yahya Jammeh dictatorship — public hearings broadcast nationwide; government has accepted most recommendations.
• Brazil (ongoing municipal and state-level commissions): National commission (2012–2014) was weak, but cities like São Paulo now run stronger ones.

Bottom Line

TRCs do not end conflicts by themselves and rarely satisfy demands for full criminal justice. But when they are:

• victim-centered,
• independent,
• empowered to name perpetrators or grant conditional amnesty,
• backed by at least minimal political will,

they become one of the most powerful tools available to turn “never again” from a slogan into a shared national reality.

The evidence from 40+ commissions since 1974 is clear: countries that combine a serious TRC with at least some prosecutions and institutional reform (South Africa, Peru, Tunisia, Colombia) have dramatically lower rates of relapse into large-scale violence than countries that rely only on trials or only on forgetting.

Hybrid Tribunals

Hybrid Tribunals in Serious Internal Conflicts

Hybrid (or “mixed”) tribunals are criminal courts that combine international and national judges, prosecutors, staff, law, and funding. They sit inside the country (or very close to it) and are created specifically to prosecute the most serious crimes committed during a civil war, genocide, or systematic repression. They emerged in the early 2000s as a “third way” between purely international tribunals (ICTY, ICTR) that were seen as distant and expensive, and purely domestic trials that were usually impossible because courts had collapsed or were still controlled by the perpetrators.

Major Hybrid Tribunals (2000–2025)

Why Countries Choose Hybrid Tribunals

1. Domestic courts are too weak, biased, or destroyed (Sierra Leone, CAR, Cambodia).
2. Purely international tribunals are politically unacceptable (Cambodia refused an ICTY-style court; Serbia refused to hand over everyone to The Hague).
3. “Teach the locals how to run fair trials” — capacity-building goal (Kosovo, Timor).
4. Signal sovereignty while still getting international money and expertise (almost all of them).

What Makes a Hybrid Tribunal Successful

High success = credible convictions of senior leaders + local ownership legitimacy no major relapse into violence

Track Record Summary (1990–2025)

• Total senior leaders convicted by hybrids ≈ 35–40
• Only one former head of state (Charles Taylor) and one former Chadian president (Habré) sentenced while alive by any post-1990 court
• Relapse into large-scale violence after hybrid tribunal: almost never (Sierra Leone, Chad, Cambodia all remained peaceful)
• Most expensive per conviction of any court model (STL cost >$1 billion for essentially three in-absentia convictions)

Current Trend (2025)

The pure hybrid model is declining. Newer mechanisms are either:

• Fully domestic with international technical assistance (Colombia Special Jurisdiction for Peace — JEP)
• Internationalized chambers inside national courts (CAR Special Criminal Court)- Ad-hoc international court (still in The Hague) for Ukraine aggression crimes (planned 2025–26)

Bottom Line

Hybrid tribunals have a better track record than most people think:

• They almost always deliver at least some high-profile convictions.
• They contribute to stable peace (Sierra Leone and Cambodia are now two of the clearest post-conflict success stories).
• They work best when the government actually wants the court to succeed and when the international community pays the bills without trying to micromanage every verdict.

When those two conditions are missing (East Timor panels, Cambodia for many years, STL), they become expensive symbolic exercises. But when they are present, hybrids remain the single most effective tool for delivering credible international justice on the soil of the country that suffered the crimes.

International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) in Countries with Serious Internal Conflicts

The ICC (established 2002, 125 member states as of 2025) is the only permanent global court for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and (since 2018) the crime of aggression. Unlike hybrid tribunals, it is not located in the conflict country and has no police force — it depends entirely on state cooperation.

ICC Track Record in Internal Conflicts (2002–2025)

Summary of Results After 23 Years

• Total convictions: 13 (10 from DR Congo/Uganda situations, 3 elsewhere)
• Heads of state/government indicted: 6 (Bashir, Gaddafi, Kenyatta, Gbagbo, Putin, Netanyahu) → zero ever appeared in The Hague
• Situations that ended major violence partly because of ICC: arguably zero (Uganda and DRC violence ended for other reasons)
• Situations clearly made worse or prolonged by ICC: at least Kenya (2009–2013) and arguably Libya

Why the ICC Struggles in Active or Recent Internal Conflicts

When the ICC Has Been Useful Anyway

1. Symbolic delegitimisation (Putin cannot travel to 125 countries; Bashir’s travel severely curtailed after 2009)
2. National complement: evidence collected by ICC has been used in domestic or hybrid trials (Germany convicted RSF leader in 2021 using ICC material)
3. Closing impunity gaps for mid-level commanders when states cooperate (DR Congo, Mali)
4. Historical record and victim acknowledgment (filings and confirmations of charges create public archive)

Bottom Line for Countries with Serious Internal Conflicts

The ICC is almost never a direct conflict-resolution tool. It does not stop ongoing wars, rarely arrests sitting leaders, and can complicate peace negotiations.

Its realistic contributions are:

• Long-term deterrence for the next generation of warlords in countries that genuinely cooperate
• Symbolic justice and historical clarification
• Occasional delivery of convictions against mid-level perpetrators when the government hands them over

For ending or preventing relapse into major internal conflict, the negotiated political deals, hybrid tribunals, truth commissions, and peacekeeping operations discussed earlier remain vastly more effective. The ICC is a court of last resort — and in the middle of a civil war, it is almost always the last actor that can actually change facts on the ground.